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## 1. Introduction

This paper makes use of a review of the literature on African labour markets, the international literature on youth and the labour market and a fifteen country African data set to analyze the current situation of youth in sub-Saharan labour markets.

Economies in Sub-Sahara Africa are generally viewed as having achieved poor economic growth over the past four decades or so (Bigsten 1996, Collier & Gunning 1999, Kaplan 1996). This has had an adverse impact on poverty and inequality. On the whole per capita incomes have fallen since the early 1970s (ADB 1997). Some of the reasons cited in this literature for the poor growth performance of sub-Saharan Africa include: lack of openness to trade, lack of financial depth, deficient public services, lack of social capital, high incidence of shocks and misguided economic policy. The process of economic development involves the allocation of labour within sectors and the reallocation of labour between sectors and to the extent that this process is impeded, the transformation of the economy is slowed and made less efficient (Bigsten and Horton 1997). Thus the functioning of the labour market is central to economic growth, income distribution and poverty alleviation and is thus an important (if not the most important) prong in the various areas that should be considered for policy intervention.

Having established the centrality of the labour market, it is important for this research programme to immediately flag the special importance of youth in any such analysis of African labour markets. We go straight to the fifteen country data set to do this. Using those aged between 15-24 to define youth, table 1 displays the size of the youth component relative to other categories for the fifteen countries for which data is available. In most of the countries reported on in the table the 0-15 individuals make up close to half of the total population. In addition, the 15-24 youth make up around a fifth of the total population. This table immediately makes the point that youth are a much larger share of the total population in African countries than they are in other developing countries (Curtain 2004). This is important because it establishes the fact that youth participation in the labour market is a key labour market issue and also a key development issue in African economies. We take this central claim as given in the rest of the paper.

The classical development literature has tended to focus on structural change, which involves the transfer of labour between the rural and the urban sector of the economy (Lewis 1954, Harris and Todaro 1970, Corden and Findlay 1975). A number of these models were derived in the African context and they are useful in highlighting the importance of paying specific attention to both rural and urban labour markets as well as the role of migration in linking these two markets. However, these classical dualistic models are limited in their application to reality because they suggest that households either stay in rural areas to work on the family farm or they migrate to urban areas to seek wage employment. Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986) present a more realistic scenario where rural households, although restricted in the land market, are free to trade in the labour market such there is some flexibility in the allocation of household resources.

However, a further dimension that is ignored in the above models is that of youth participation in the labour market. This paper is directed at flagging the key issues pertaining to the participation of youth in labour markets in sub-Saharan Africa in order to show that there is clear justification in regarding the youth as a group in need of special attention rather than blanket coverage under general labour market policies. It draws on available literature on African labour markets, on international literature on youth participation in the labour market and on a data set of fifteen African countries. The paper begins by looking at some of the characteristics of African labour markets for youth. The issues covered include migration, adult/youth comparisons and gender comparisons within youth. Migration is a key issue because we establish that unemployment is mainly an urban phenomenon yet large numbers of youth continue to flow into urban areas every year. The argument we make throughout this section is that youth labour market participants are different to adults and should be treated separately. Consideration should be given to the urban labour market and what can be done to alleviate the pressures placed on it by youth migration. Although economic desperation is often cited as a major reason for rural to urban migration in general, we find that youth migration is also influenced by ethnic conflicts as well as aspirations to be in the urban environment. Thus the policy implications of these findings are that rural development strategies, relocation initiatives and other policies aimed at keeping youth out of cities, alone may not stem the flow of youth into urban areas. Focus has to be directed at harnessing the potential of youth within the urban environment.

The paper goes on to investigate the functioning of urban and rural labour markets for youth by looking at labour market participation and unemployment differences between youth and adults and the impact of location on these differences. We find considerable variation from country to country which indicates that a number of country specific circumstances need to be controlled for before a true picture will emerge about the differences between the youth and adult labour market participants. That said, there is a strong *a priori* expectation that urban adult labour force participation should be at least as high as that of rural adults assuming that they have migrated to urban areas to seek employment. However, discouraged worker effects may result in lower observed urban participation rates depending on the unemployment definitions that are used. The same prediction cannot be made for youth, however, given that some may migrate for access to urban schooling. In the education section we establish that schooling is not high among the 15-24 age group. Therefore, if youth and adults are similar in terms of the labour market, then similar factors might impact on their perception of the labour market such that their participation rates at least (if not employment rates as well) would be similar. Yet, empirically, we find that in most countries the youth/adult participation ratio is less than 60%, implying that youth and adults have different perceptions of the labour market. The unemployment rates of youth in urban areas far exceed those of adults, thus indicating that prospects facing youth in the urban labour market differ markedly from those facing adults.

Agricultural employment dominates the rural labour market landscape for youth and adults. In addition we find that youth participation rates are high but unemployment rates are low in rural areas. Collectively, this seems to support the intuition of much African development literature arguing that, in rural areas, open unemployment is often replaced or disguised as low productivity, agricultural underemployment.

This African development literature also highlights the gender inequalities that seem to be part of the development process. These gender inequalities are likely to persist if there are biases within the family that affect the range of options available to young women (e.g. migration, labour market participation, and education). The literature argues that cultural norms and tastes as well as role model effects ensure that these biases persist. We find some evidence in support of this in that a large proportion rural young women are homemakers or else are employed while rural young men are either employed or studying. In the urban environment we find that youth gender biases in education are not as stark as in the rural environment although there are still significant proportions of young girls who are homemakers. These results imply that gender biases within the family still have an impact on youth activities. In weighing this finding against biases within the labour market we find that unemployment rates and labour participation are fairly similar among young men and women. Therefore the main differences between youth by gender are in the activities in which they participate and in particular that more men are students and more women are homemakers.

The paper then goes on to investigate education levels with a particular focus on gender and age differences. Given the link between education and expected earnings, this discussion of education provides another key viewpoint on the functioning of urban and rural labour markets. The fifteen country data set shows that, for the youth and older adults, female education levels are lower than male levels. Thus there are likely to be stark earnings differentials by gender within the labour market. This is consistent with what is found in the African labour market literature.

Generally, education levels are very low by international standards. However, these levels are higher for youth than for adults. Thus, while school to work transitions would be expected to occur earlier for African youth than in developed countries, this situation is changing. Youth are staying in schools longer than their parents. In some countries such as South Africa, high repetition rates imply very late ages of exit from secondary education. In addition, there is some evidence that the youth combine schooling with part-time work; especially in rural areas.

This analysis of education is followed by an attempt to broadly link the well being of households to the youth labour market outcomes observed in the preceding sections. The literature suggests two key features. First, household members who are not economically active and earning resources place strain on household resources. Second, those households with resources can and do secure better educational outcomes for their children. Therefore, youth in poorer households face great pressure to engage in resource earning activities and, at the same time, they often face an appealing array of educational opportunities. It can be speculated that these sorts of dynamics underpin the findings in the literature of low educational levels, the continued participation of youth in low productivity agricultural employment and the common balancing of part-time schooling and part-time work.

Despite these unfortunate dynamics and high grade repetition rates, case studies of educational projects find that there are very strong social returns to investment in both education and training within this milieu. The fact that the literacy rates of the youth are markedly higher than older generations is a sign of some success from sustained investment and prioritization of education.

On the basis of this detailed picture of the functioning of youth labour markets, the paper then shifts its focus to address a few key cross-cutting issues. The first is the suitability of the unemployment rate as an indicator of youth labour market outcomes. We find that this indicator is not suitable and that a better indicator is the youth inactivity rate which measures the proportion of a specific age cohort (15-19 or 20-24) that is neither in full-time education nor in full-time work. The second issue discussed is that of finding a suitable definition of youth. We find that it is difficult to suggest a single definition as these vary markedly across countries. We suggest that it is the lower bound age in a definition of youth that should be a key issue of focus because the analysis reveals that schooling stops at low levels and therefore that labour market activity begins at a young age in many of the countries in this study. The third issue discussed in this section is that of youth specific causes of youth unemployment. Most of the youth who migrate from rural to urban areas do so for reasons other than economic viability and, therefore, they generally lack the skills required to break into the urban labour market. Furthermore, they are reluctant to move to rural areas thus pressure is placed on the urban labour market and policy intervention becomes more complex. This discussion also cautions that in the face of insufficient aggregate demand the most well conceived of youth employment policies are likely to be ineffective. The final section discusses policy issues based on the findings of the paper.

## **2. Characteristics of African Labour markets for youth**

### **2.1 Migration, rural and urban labour markets and agriculture**

African countries are often regarded as being much more urbanized than is warranted by their degree of economic development (Hope 1998). The continent's rate of urbanization (at 5%) in the period 1985-90, for example, surpassed all other regions of the developing world (Ogbu and Ikiara 1995). More recently, Harsch (2001), estimates that the rate of urbanization in Africa has declined to 4%, which is still the highest of any world region. Some countries stand out, for example, Dar es Salaam (Tanzania's capital) is the fastest growing city in East Africa and has the highest growth rate of any region in the world (Torrey 1998). Furthermore, the proportion of rural to urban female migrants has also been increasing (Gugler 1996). These trends naturally put pressure on the urban labour market.

However, looking at the structure of labour markets in sub-Saharan Africa in general, Bigsten (1997) suggests that urban employment is generally found to be a small share of total employment. This is a perturbing finding given the high influx of migrants from rural areas. The reasons for rural to urban migration in the face of poor employment prospects in cities are not obvious. The dualistic model of two options, either rural work on a family farm or else migration to urban areas is too simplistic. In reality rural households trade in labour in order to reach optimal land/labour ratios. In poorly developed areas though the desired labour allocation may not be reached.

Although rural labour markets are not perfect, neither are they non-existent. The bulk of rural employment is in agriculture and most agricultural labour is in smallholding self-employment although agricultural wage employment also exists. Indeed, table 4 indicates that for our sample of countries it is in only three (Sao Tome and Principe, Kenya and Ghana) that the agricultural sector does not employ more than 70% of rural workers in both the 15-24 and 25-54 cohorts. In addition, a comparison of the occupational distribution of agricultural versus non-agricultural employment (table 5)

confirms that, in agriculture, most workers are in informal employment or self employment. Formal wage sector employment within agriculture is negligible in most countries except urban Kenya (16%), urban Uganda (18%) and rural and urban Sao Tome and Principe (28% and 32% respectively).

Nevertheless, some rural employment outside of agriculture also exists in either formal or informal activities. Table 5 shows that in most countries, most of rural non-agricultural employment is in self-employment. There also exist a range of secondary and tertiary activities in rural areas (Bigsten 1997) and all these activities taken together result in low open unemployment. However, a popular view is that even though there is high recorded employment in rural areas this employment generates meager incomes for rural workers. Bigsten (1997) argues that Africa has had the worst development of agricultural labour productivity of all developing countries. These findings lend support to the idea that rural to urban migration in Africa occurs, to a large extent, because rural Africans are so desperate that they are willing to try their chances in the unpromising urban labour market (Hope 1998).

There is some evidence that the strategy of migration to urban areas in some instances does make sense. Based mainly on a studies of Kenya it seems that recent rural migrants move directly into urban employment (Mazumdar 1983, Francis and Hoddinot 1993, Bigsten 1995). According to this literature, this happens because rural to urban migration is part of the optimization strategy of rural households, where differences in returns in different markets determine the allocation of labour. The evidence further suggests that migration is not a speculative decision but one that is determined by information obtained from a network of contacts. However, given the high rates of urban unemployment in sub-Saharan Africa though, it is clear that a large number of rural to urban migrants fall outside of this group who find employment easily. In addition the literature shows a high rate of rural to urban migration of youth (Ogbu and Ikiara 1995, Linden 1996, Sommers 2003). Therefore, we speculate that a large proportion of the migrants who do not find urban employment are youth. However, we are unable to obtain figures for the youth component in rural urban migration.

Sommers (2003) suggests that youth migrate to urban areas for reasons very different to the ones mentioned above: Ethnic conflicts, which are almost always rural in origin, are one of the factors that drive youth to cities where the climate is more homogeneous. It is believed, for instance, that the absence of large cities in Burundi has encouraged the clashes between the Hutus and Tsutsis. Support for this assertion may be garnered from the fact that many Burundians who live in the capital are conscious of their identity only in times of conflict (Ould-Abdallah 2000).

Another factor influencing the high concentration of young people in the urban environment is that youth already in urban areas have a strong resolve to remain there. This determination persists even though there have been findings that the urban poor are very often worse off than rural dwellers (Linden 1996). In Dar es Salaam, for example, the government campaigned to repatriate urban migrants, most of whom were young men, to rural areas. The efforts failed and amounted to a waste of scarce transportation resources (Sommers 2003). Migrant youth, both voluntary and forced, therefore generally regard themselves to be urbanized.

We have shown that the migration of youth from rural to urban areas is a key labour market issue. However, much of the micro detail of this migration is missing. Are these youth migrants more productive or less productive than non-migrants? What is their labour market status before they migrate? What is their process of integration into the labour market? The literature seems to suggest that efforts to develop rural areas may not have the desired effect of enticing urban youth migrants back to rural areas.

## **2.2 Differences between youth and adult labour market participants**

In this section we aim to show indirectly, using the participation and employment data, that the labour market conditions faced by youth differ sufficiently from those faced by adults such that special policies should be directed at youth. If youth and adults are similar in terms of the labour market, then similar factors will impact on their perception of the labour market such that their participation rates at least (if not employment rates as well) would be similar. One can predict the participation patterns that should emerge for adults in the urban and rural location. Urban adult labour force participation should be at least as high as that of rural adults assuming that they have migrated to urban areas to seek employment. However, discouraged worker effects may result in lower observed urban participation rates depending on the definition used. The same prediction cannot be made for youth, however, given that some may migrate for access to urban schooling. However we do establish in the education section that schooling is not high among the 15-24 age group. Thus, there are a number of open issues to confront.

Table 2 indicates that, generally, youth participation rates are less than those of the adult population. Furthermore, in most countries in the fifteen country data set, rural participation rates exceed urban participation rates. Some of the differences between countries may be due to data difficulties and the lack of strict comparability in labour market definitions across surveys. However, the differences across countries are stark enough to emphasize the considerable heterogeneities across countries in overall labour participation rates and in the participation rates of youth. The final column of table 2 shows the ratio of labour participation rates for the youth relative to adults. This is an attempt to address the issue of whether the differences in youth participation rates across countries are primarily a reflection of differences in aggregate participation rates. If they are, then the ratio should be close to one. As it turns out, the ratio varies widely across countries from a low of 29% in Uganda to a high of 94% in Ghana. In most countries, however, the youth/adult participation ratio is less than 60%, implying that youth and adults have different perceptions of the labour market.

We explore this theme further in table 3 with a specific focus on unemployment. As discussed earlier, in African economies, unemployment is widely regarded as being mainly an urban phenomenon because agriculture, and small-holder or peasant agriculture in particular, is a big source of employment in rural areas (Bigsten 1997). This literature argues that unemployment in rural areas manifests itself mainly in the form of underemployment. Table 3 provides some support for this stylized fact about African labour markets. Among the 25-54 age cohort rural unemployment is less than 10% in all the countries surveyed while urban unemployment for the same cohort is generally above 10%. However, rural youth unemployment is a significant issue for the youth in a number of countries, most notably: Ghana (76%), Kenya (33%),



Mozambique (27%), and Sao Tome Principe (30%). It is interesting that Kenya and Mozambique are part of this list despite their relatively low rural youth participation rates. This indicates that the rural labour markets in these countries do not favour youth employment.

Considerable variation in participation and unemployment levels between the countries exists. For example, Guinea's rural youth unemployment rate is only 2% given a very high participation rate of 94%, thus indicating high labour absorptive capacity. As it was with participation, Ghana is the clear outlier on the high side in terms of both rural and urban youth unemployment rates. In the Ghanaian case the very high unemployment and the very high youth participation rates suggest large scale failures within the schooling system in this country in both rural and urban areas. Conclusions such as this one on the failure of the Ghanaian education system are premised on the fact that there is agreement about satisfactory definitions of unemployment rates and that these rates are informative about the function of a labour market. This is an issue to which this paper will return.

The general trends that emanate from the analysis in this section are that urban participation rates in comparison with rural are relatively low while unemployment rates are relatively high. Furthermore, low rural unemployment masks a significant amount of underemployment. In addition, the difference in the proportion of youth and adults unemployed is greater in urban areas, therefore, youth are worse off in urban areas with regard to employment.

### **2.3. Gender differences in the characteristics of youth participation**

Analysis in the previous subsection indicated that there are significant differences in participation and unemployment rates between older and younger cohorts as well as between rural and urban areas. This section looks to provide further detail to our picture of youth labour markets. A particular focus is on gender differences, which are likely to be evident in both the rural and urban labour markets.

The 'women in development literature' has pointed out over the past four decades that women have benefited insufficiently from the development process (Colclough 2003). Economic growth tended to facilitate the expansion of urban areas, where men predominated. Urban growth was driven by rural to urban migration where predominantly men were the migrants. Thus opportunities for higher income and for greater choice in work and leisure favoured men. In this study, the main protagonists for this gender inequality were found to be employers and government rather than the development process itself. However, with respect to young women, there may be biases within the family that affect the range of options available to them. These biases could be influenced by cultural norms and tastes or role model effects, which means that gender differences are passed on from one generation to another (Bigsten 1997). This section thus pays attention to labour market related differences between young men and women.

When looking at the main activities that youth engage in, table 6 indicates that the main activity (for rural youth) is employment in most countries, while being involved with studies is generally the next biggest activity. A higher proportion of young men than women tend to be employed and studying in most countries. The rural employment differences are generally slight while the education differences tend to vary more. In

Guinea, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Cote d'Ivoire and Burundi in particular the proportion of youth, both male and female that are employed is surprisingly high.

This has important implications for school to work transitions and also for education policy. The rural youth of Burkina Faso, for example, seem to enter the labour market with very little education as 92% of them (from table 1) already participate in the labour market. Youth in these circumstances are at risk of being trapped in insecure and low wage employment for all of their working lives. However, the agricultural bias of rural employment may be one factor encouraging early school leaving. It then becomes a vicious circle as improved agricultural productivity is necessary for rural poverty alleviation while higher educational attainment is key to this improved productivity (Ayogu & Bhorat 2003, Weir 1999). Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, and Uganda on the other hand have relatively high proportions of youth who are students although the gender differences are apparent.

Rural unemployment does not seem to be a major concern in most countries (generally below 10%) except for Ghana with 61% and 55% and Sao Tome Principe with 17% and 14% of males and females respectively unemployed. It is particularly striking that 56% of Ethiopian and 37% of Mozambican rural male youths are homemakers.

In contrast to the rural youth, the proportion urban youth that are employed (table 7a) is much less. Generally the proportions of males employed tend to be higher than those of females as evidenced by the gender employment ratios in table 7b. The largest difference is found in Sao Tome and Principe. In most countries the proportion of urban male youth employed is less than 40% except for Burkina Faso, Kenya, Madagascar and Sao Tome and Principe. For women it is only in Guinea and Madagascar that up to 40% are employed. Burundi, Malawi and Nigeria have relatively high proportions of youth who are students. Uganda has 61% urban male youth enrolment but only 36% urban female youth enrolment.

Overall there are gender differences in the main activities youth engage in. However, as table 7b illustrates, these differences are not uniform across countries. For example, although higher proportions of males are employed in general, Burundi, Ghana, Guinea, Zambia and Cameroon display higher proportions of rural female employment while Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria display higher proportions of urban female employment. In addition, the gender differences in proportions employed are more than double for rural Ethiopia and Nigeria, and for both rural and urban Sao Tome and Principe. With respect to rural unemployment, six out of fourteen countries have higher proportions of women who are unemployed. Uganda stands out having a proportion of rural men unemployed that is more than four times that of women who are unemployed. With respect to urban unemployment, a similar pattern emerges with seven of fifteen countries displaying higher proportions of female unemployment.

Table 8 shows a more detailed breakdown of youth labour force participation than table 2. It allows for an analysis of the gender differences in youth participation rates by location. It is notable that rural labour force participation is relatively low in Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Malawi and Uganda. Female labour force participation is also significantly less than that of males in Nigeria. Some of the countries with low rural participation rates, like Ethiopia and Kenya, have urban participation rates that

compare well with the rest of the countries. Others, however, such as Malawi, Nigeria and Uganda display low participation rates in both the rural and urban setting.

When comparing the unemployment of youth across gender and location, in table 9, it is apparent that female unemployment is generally higher than that of males with the exception of Ghana, Malawi and Nigeria. Malawi and Zambia have relatively low unemployment rates but this is most likely related to the fact that these countries have very low participation rates. Rural unemployment rates are also lower than urban unemployment rates except for Kenya and Sao Tome and Principe. This finding is not entirely surprising given that the share of agricultural employment in rural employment for these two countries is low when compared to the others in the sample (table 4). The question that begs answering at this stage is where the employed youth are finding employment. It has been established thus far that rural youth are employed mainly in the agricultural sector, Burkina Faso is a prime example of where this is the case (table 4). However, in a country such as Ghana rural agricultural employment as a share of total rural employment is only 55% while in Cameroon urban agricultural employment is only 8% of total urban employment for youth.

Table 10 provides a closer look at Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Ghana in illustrating some of the other sectors that are significant employers of youth within these countries. In Burkina Faso rural employment of both genders is overwhelmingly in agriculture. Urban employment is split mainly between agriculture, commerce and manufacturing with similar proportions within genders. Rural Cameroon displays a similar pattern to that of rural Burkina Faso with similar patterns between the genders. However, there are stark urban employment differences between the two countries. The proportion of urban men and women employed in the agricultural sector is much lower in Cameroon than in Burkina Faso. In addition, a significantly higher proportion of urban women than men is employed in the commerce sector in Cameroon. However, 10% of the employed young males in Cameroon are employed in the transport sector whereas young women are hardly represented in this sector.

In contrast to other countries, in Ghana only 39% of rural employed female youth are in agriculture compared to 72% males. Furthermore, 29% of employed rural women are in the commerce sector compared to only 5% of males employed. A higher proportion of employed women are in manufacturing as well. These Ghanaian results look positive. However, it should be recalled that Ghana is the outlier in terms of high unemployment rates (table 9) and high urban participation rates (table 8).

The conclusions that we draw from this subsection are that a large proportion rural young women are either homemakers or else employed while rural young men are either employed or studying. In the urban environment we find that youth gender biases are not as stark as in the rural environment although there are still significant proportions of young girls who are homemakers. These results imply that gender biases within the family still have an impact on youth activities. In weighing this finding against biases within the labour market we find that participation and unemployment rates are fairly similar among young men and women. Therefore the main differences between youth by gender are in the activities they partake in and in particular that more men are students and more women are homemakers. In terms of where youth are finding employment our finding is that besides the agricultural sector, the commerce and manufacturing sectors stand out as other significant employers of youth.

We conclude section 2 by reflecting across the detail of section 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. The analysis has shown that migration of youth from rural to urban areas is a key labour market issue. Reasons for youth migration extend beyond those of economic desperation such that efforts to develop rural areas or relocate youth to rural areas may not succeed. Focus has to be directed also at harnessing the potential of youth within the urban environment. We have also argued that the labour market conditions faced by youth differ markedly from those faced by adults. Thus a blanket labour market policy would be inappropriate in addressing the unemployment of youth. We find that in most countries the youth/adult participation ratio is less than 60%, implying that youth and adults have different perceptions of the labour market. In latter parts of the paper there will be discussion about the implications of finding a common definition of youth across countries, which is necessary to be able to make strong arguments about the general applicability of labour market policies directed at the youth. However, the huge variance in the above ratio suggests that there are going to be weaknesses and costs associated with any standard definition of youth from the point of view of labour market analysis. With respect to unemployment we find that the rural labour market caters for both youth and adults. The most likely reason for this is the importance of agriculture in this environment. The unemployment rates of youth in urban areas far exceed those of adults, thus indicating that prospects facing youth in the urban labour market differ markedly from those facing adults. Finally, we have established that gender differences in youth are largely in the activities they partake in rather than in labour market participation and employment.

One can only go so far by looking at breakdowns of forms of participation and forms of employment. One of the obvious limitations is that we have not been able to deal with the migration issue which Bigsten raises as important. An analysis of education provides another very useful lens on the youth labour market. Clearly the transition from school to work is a key aspect of youth labour markets. In addition, schooling determines productivity and this has a strong bearing on earnings. Thus, we now turn to a discussion of education.

### **3. Education**

Education plays an important role because of the important role that it plays in the labour market outcomes of youth in general (Psacharopoulos 1994). Since the 1960s many African countries undertook major educational expansion but soon economic slowdown set in, followed by stagnation in the 1970s and decline in the 1990s (Appleton et al 1999).

Despite this macroeconomic trend, the microeconomic returns to education in sub-Saharan Africa have generally been regarded as being relatively high when compared to other regions of the world, based on the conclusions of Psacharopoulos. Bennell (1995), however, illustrates that Psacharopoulos's findings for Africa rely too heavily on a few dated studies and unreliable data. Studies estimating conventional Mincerian rates of return to education since the 1980s have reported more modest effects (Appleton 1999).

It is not clear, however, whether this represents a fall in the returns to education or whether returns were never as high as indicated by Psacharopoulos. A study of Kenyan rates of return to education by Appleton et al (1999) reveals that returns to secondary education have fallen in the period 1978-1995 mainly as a result of the

narrowing of the wage premium to workers having secondary education qualifications, with direct costs having remained stable. The wage benefits to primary education were found to have fallen drastically while data on tertiary level returns was sparse, leading to a cautious conclusion that these returns may have increased during the period under review. Appleton et al postulate that findings in other African countries could very well be similar. Certainly, the work of Keswell and Poswell (2002) endorses this for the South African case. This work documents declining returns to education at the secondary level but sharply increasing returns at the tertiary level.

With regard to gender effects of returns to education the findings vary from country to country. Studies of Kenya and Tanzania, for example, reveal that virtually all the difference in male and female earnings is explained by lower levels of education and labour market experience of women (Knight and Sabot 1991). Evidence from Ethiopia, Uganda, and Cote d'Ivoire (Appleton et al. 1995) indicates that differences in earnings between men and women are based not only on lesser education levels of women but also on stereotyping of women into certain occupations. This literature further indicates that education has a more powerful effect on male participation in Ethiopia and Cote d'Ivoire and that conditional on participation, returns to education are not gender biased in Cote d'Ivoire and Uganda. It seems that generally returns to education are not less for women once they have entered the labour market but that their entry is lower such that the realized returns are lower (Bigsten 1997). Part of the explanation for the poor educational attainment of girls relative to boys is explained by the fact that girls score lower in primary school examinations. This coupled with the fact that primary school results determine acceptance into secondary schooling, leads to fewer females in secondary education.

Turning our focus to the evidence from the 15 country data set, we begin with an analysis of educational attainment for a selection of countries. Educational attainment appears to be rather low in most countries. Among the selection of countries in the table 11, Ethiopia, Malawi and Guinea have large shares (in excess of 70%) of both young and adult individuals with no education. When comparing these results with the youth participation rates in table 8 it is notable that participation rates are relatively low for Ethiopia and Malawi. Guinea on the other hand has relatively high youth participation rates. In addition, the proportion of the population with secondary education is also very low across the countries with only Kenya and Nigeria reaching double digits. The participation rates of Kenya and Nigeria are not high either suggesting therefore no clear relationship between participation and educational attainment.

When considering the relationship between educational attainment and unemployment, again no clear picture emerges. Kenya with relatively good educational attainment displays poor to average unemployment rates while Nigeria also having relatively good educational attainment displays relatively low unemployment rates. Malawi with relatively poor educational attainment displays relatively low unemployment rates, but this is in part due to the low participation rates in this country.

It is often proposed that unemployment in developing countries is concentrated among the better-educated youth. This is known as the 'educated' youth hypothesis. Evidence from southern Africa suggests otherwise though, as tertiary-level-graduates have higher employment rates than others with lesser educational attainment (O'Higgins

2001). Often where there is higher unemployment with education it is because participation increases with educational attainment. Furthermore, the rapid advances in educational attainment in developing countries over the past few decades have led to a situation where youth unemployment is very likely to coincide with rising average years of education. This must not be confused with a causal relationship.

When looking at the proportions of youth that have ever attended school, three factors are immediately apparent from table 12. One, that the proportion of males who have ever attended school is consistently higher than that of females in both the rural and urban setting. Two, that the proportion of urban youth who have ever attended school is generally higher than rural although in some countries such as Kenya and Sao Tome Principe the differences are slight. Three, that the difference between male and female proportions is less in the urban location than in the rural setting.

Generally male youth are more likely to have ever attended school and to have higher levels of educational attainment. It also follows then that male literacy rates are generally higher than those of females. These education findings imply that education is a key dimension of gender inequality for youth in the labour market. This contrasts markedly with earlier findings reflecting more muted gender differentials with regard to unemployment rates and sectors of employment. Even assuming no discrimination in the labour market, these educational differentials can be expected to manifest themselves in productivity differentials and in earnings differentials.

In addition, when considering the literacy rates in table 13, it is clear that youth literacy rates are higher than those of the 25-54 cohort, with the exception of Madagascar and Sao Tome and Principe. Furthermore, rural literacy rates are relatively low in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Madagascar. Urban literacy rates are also relatively low for these countries.

The findings above echo those by Colclough *et al* (2003) who find that the education systems of many sub-Saharan countries suffer from low capacity, wide gender gaps in school participation and poor school quality. We find that very few of these countries where more than 10% of their youth have secondary or tertiary level educational attainment. A clear relationship between educational attainment and participation in the labour force cannot be drawn as there are countries with poor educational attainment and poor participation rates (Ethiopia and Malawi) and others with poor educational attainment and good participation rates (such as?). Similarly, no definite conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between educational attainment and unemployment.

Furthermore, the importance of education to youth outcomes in general is highlighted by Knowles and Behrman (2003) who analyse cost benefit data for 41 programmes, aimed at investing in youth in developing countries. The programmes fall into six broad categories: formal schooling, civilian and military training, work, reproductive health, school-based health, other health, community and other. Their findings are that investing in formal schooling yields amongst the highest economic returns to all programmes targeted at youth. This is true whether such investments are directed at improving the quality of schooling in general or through targeted scholarship programmes aimed at individuals as well as adult basic education and literacy targeted at adolescents. The study further identified education as the investment with the largest

range of multiplier effects. Some of the quantifiable benefits mentioned are: an increase in labour productivity, reduced probability of youth unemployment, reduced child labour, lower rates of adolescent pregnancy, lower levels of HIV infection and other sexually transmitted infections, improved health and mental health, less likelihood of drug/alcohol abuse as well as physical and/or sexual abuse, more control of fertility for young women, less chance of social exclusion and reduced likelihood of violence and civil conflict.

Taken collectively, the available literature and our data seem to imply that there is much room left for education-based productivity improvements for youth in rural and urban areas. The fact that returns to education are high at the late secondary and tertiary levels makes a case for a sustained increase in average years of education beyond levels associated with basic literacy. Indeed, there are countries that have made remarkable progress in increasing primary school enrolments of boys and girls, and in some, the quality of school provision as well. Due to the widely varying cross-country patterns we observe in this analysis and the views expressed in the international literature, it is clear that there are no standard recipes nor solutions to fit all situations. However, lessons can be drawn from countries that have achieved relative successes over the past two decades (O’Gara et al. 1999). This discussion will be taken up in the policy section. Moving on, it seems plausible to assert that the observed variations between genders and between countries certainly have family background as one of the underlying influences. The next section picks up on this theme, relying on the available literature as well as data on household heads from the 15 country data set.

#### **4. Household influence**

We now turn to a brief discussion of the well being of households and the bearing this has on members of the household. There is no doubting the correlation between the labour market status of adults in a household and the level of well-being in the household. Households with a large number or share of employed adults are better off in income or consumption terms. Unemployed household members are a serious resource drain on households. (Leibbrandt, Borat and Woolard, 2001).

In turn, this situation of the household has a bearing on the education and employment outcomes of youth. There are two major prongs through which this linkage can occur. First, there is the direct link between household resources and youth outcomes. It is expected that household’s who are better off in terms of income and wealth will be in a position to ensure that their youth attain the best possible education. In addition, such households will have the resources to cover the costs of job search and even migration for their youth when they move into the labour market (Dinkelman and Pirouz 2002). Second, there is a literature focusing on the relationship between well-educated parents and the educational attainment of their children (Lam 1999).

Cutting across these two areas is the literature exploring the relationship between the employment situation of adults and the employment situation of youth. Households with employed adults will certainly have the resources to facilitate good educational outcomes and good labour market outcomes. They are also likely to have better labour market information which promotes efficient job search behaviour

Without good quality panel data, it is very hard to separately identify these pathways between household material and human capital endowments and youth education and labour market outcomes. This is unfortunate because the isolation of these mechanisms and an assessment of their magnitude are key for focused policy conclusions about educational attainment and promoting efficient progression of youth into the labour market.

In the empirical literature on the links between households and youth, the education and employment status of the head of the household is often used as a proxy for all adults in the household. In households where the head is relatively highly educated the youth are expected to fare better at school. In addition, in households where the head is relatively well employed, youth face better chances of finding employment.

The fifteen country data set can be broken out by household head. However, in the data, it is very hard to link any of this data on household head to youth. We present two illustrative tables in the appendix (table 14 and table 15).

Table 14 displays activities of the household head. In most of the countries in the sample, the household heads are predominantly in self-employment. The exceptions are Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda. In Ethiopia, 79% of household heads are in formal sector wage employment and 11% are in informal wage employment. In Kenya 15% of the household heads are in formal sector wage employment, 15% in government wage employment and 19% in informal sector employment. The bulk of Nigeria's household heads (71%) are classified under self employment. In Uganda, 83% of household heads are classified under employer but this is likely to be an error or that employment is classified differently in this country. The share of household heads in government wage employment is relatively high (greater than 14%) in Kenya, Sao Tome and Principe, and Zambia. Comparing these findings to those in Table 5, it seems that the activities of the household head are broadly correlated with the activities of all employed members of the household. There are some exceptions. For example, it seems as though household heads are more likely to be in self employment than other individuals in Burkina Faso. However, it would seem that one would need a more disaggregated look at the data to ascertain whether there are difference in what the employed youth are doing compared to their parents and the head of their household.

When considering the sector of employment of household heads in table 15 it appears that in most countries household heads are mainly employed in agriculture. It is only in Kenya and Sao Tome and Principe that less than 50% of household heads are employed in agriculture. In Kenya a relatively high 29% of household heads are employed in the commerce sector. Sao Tome and Principe, Cameroon, Ghana and Zambia also have relatively significant shares of household heads (around 15%) employed in the commerce sector. The proportion of household heads employed in manufacturing is generally around 5% or less except for Ghana and Sao Tome and Principe, which are 10%. In addition, public administration generally employs less than 5% of household heads although there are exceptions such as Guinea and Kenya where 10% and 12% of household heads respectively are employed in public administration.



Thus far the paper has focused on combining the literature and the 15 country data set to come to an understanding of the youth labour market. Attention is now turned to some key issues that emanate from the above discussion and which have a bearing on how policy interventions are structured. These are the unemployment rate, the definition of youth and the causes of youth unemployment.

## 5. Key issues of debate

### 5.1. Is the unemployment rate a good indicator?

Having discussed a range of issues on the characteristics of youth unemployment we now turn to a discussion of the suitability of the unemployment rate as a useful indicator of youth labour market outcomes. A major reason for questioning the unemployment rate as an indicator of the well-being of youth is that reliable data on youth unemployment is scarce in most African countries. The ILO database *Key Indicators of the Labour Market* (September 2003) shows that virtually no African countries have unemployment statistics which show changes over time. Curtain (2004) indicates that only eight African countries (Botswana, Egypt, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia and Zimbabwe) can derive their unemployment statistics from a nationally representative labour force survey. Another twelve countries paper on unemployment using employment office records which are based on the number of job applicants. Gabon uses its population census while Rwanda uses a household survey. Some countries such as Algeria and Mauritius rely solely on official estimates. Therefore, there is no consistency in the reported statistics. To obtain this consistency, nationally representative surveys need to be carried out periodically at a substantial financial outlay. The use of employment agency records of registered job seekers is not a robust alternative as these records do not satisfy the ILO definition of the unemployed.

Furthermore, the definition of employment and the reference period vary widely from country to country. The ILO defines employment as encompassing all types of employment situations, including casual labour, short term work and all forms of irregular employment. Most African countries use the broadest definition of unemployment, which is paid work for at least an hour over a reference period of usually one week. There are variations. For example, South Africa uses five hours over the reference period and Morocco uses a reference period of one month. Furthermore, there is variation in the starting age at which unemployment is recorded as was alluded to above.

There are conceptual issues that also need to be addressed. As an important example, the use of the unemployment rate as a single indicator of the youth unemployment situation is problematic when considering the prevalence of greater participation in education together with part time working by students. Use of the unemployment rate as an indicator was plausible in the past when most youth left schooling in their mid teenage years to find work (Curtain 2004). In such instances education participation was low and labour force participation was high among 15-19 year olds. Earlier we showed that there are higher levels of school attendance and higher levels of education for youth compared to adults in all fifteen African countries. With the currently high full-time education participation rates among teenagers the unemployment rate can mask large differences in the proportion of the teenage population affected by unemployment while widely differing teenage unemployment rates can mask close similarities in the proportion of the teenage population who are seeking work. Capturing such students as part of the employed would be to overstate the employment prospects of school leavers seeking full-time work. Another effect would be that the unemployment rate would be higher with the inclusion of students looking for part-time work.

Given these developments, a better labour market indicator would be a teenage unemployment to population ratio, which negates the effects of widely varying national labour participation rates. The OECD recommends the use of the ratio of unemployed non-students to the total age cohort as one measure of the likelihood of youth unemployment (OECD 1993). The most appealing measure in our view is one that concentrates on the proportion of a specific age cohort (15-19 or 20-24) who are neither in full-time education nor in full-time work and is termed a 'youth inactivity rate'. It captures the sum of non-students who are unemployed and non-students who are not in the labour force, expressed as a proportion of the age group. Furthermore, a useful measure of the effectiveness of a country's mechanisms for facilitating the transition from education to work is the employment to population ratio of young adults who are not in education.

## 5.2. Finding a suitable definition of youth

The following key points can be distilled from the analysis of the preceding sections:

- Definitions of youth vary from country to country depending on country-specific circumstances. Of necessity, the standard 15-24 definition has been used in this paper for data analysis.
- The 15-24 youth cohort as a share of the total population is generally around 20% for the countries in this study. However, some countries display very high rural youth participation rates (in excess of 90%) while others display very low rural youth participation rates (below 20%). Thus the share of the labour market that is made up of youth varies from country to country. In addition, unemployment rates and the types of employment also vary strongly across countries. This heterogeneity across countries makes it clear that, for the purposes of labour market analysis, it will be difficult to find a non-arbitrary definition of youth that fits across countries.
- As conventionally measured, unemployment is mainly an urban issue. However, underemployment is a likely feature of rural labour markets given the low measured unemployment rates in rural labour markets of many countries, the continuing importance of agricultural employment and the fact that much of this agriculture is still run as small-scale farms and self-employment.

Given the fact that the 0-15 age group makes up such a large share of the population, to the extent that any definition of youth is extended down into lower ages it will rapidly become an even more important share of the population. In different vein the table also shows that the actual population shares of the youth do vary quite widely across the countries.

Of course this definition of youth is merely a statistical decision and it is worthwhile spending some time interrogating the issue of an appropriate definition of youth in the context of an analysis of labour market participation. The official definition of youth for labour market purposes varies from country to country. Many developing countries have no minimum school leaving age. Therefore papering on labour market activity can begin as early as age 10 (for example, Argentina and Indonesia) or even at birth (Burkina Faso and Niger). Other less extreme examples are the United Nations (16 – 24), Italy (14 – 29) in the north and (14 –32) in the south, the United Kingdom (18-24), Ghana (15-35) and South Africa (16-34) (O'Higgins 2001).

A broader age range 16-34 would seem to be relevant for some countries, for example South Africa, where many young people remain in the schooling system until a relatively old age by international standards. In the South African case, the reasons include having started schooling late and slow progression through the schooling system as a result of well-documented socio-political factors. One implication of the phenomenon of late schooling is that policies aimed at facilitating the transition from school to work need to be extended beyond the more prevalent upper bound age of 24.

However, we have shown (table 11) that youth in most African countries have very low levels of education. Thus, it is not clear that such a broad functional definition of youth is generally appropriate. In many contexts it would seem that it is the lower bound age in a definition of youth that will be the key issue rather than the upper bound age.

More generally, this analysis suggests that youth should not be treated as a homogeneous group as there are differences in the characteristics of youth who are of school going age and older youth..

### **5.3 To what extent are there youth specific causes of unemployment?**

The main causes of youth unemployment have been widely studied in the economic literature. Insufficient aggregate demand, relatively high youth wages, lack of skills among the youth and the relative size of the youth labour force are among the most commonly cited causes of youth unemployment (Blanchflower & Freeman 1999, O'Higgins 2001). However, Africa is a region that has been ravaged by conflict, disease and natural disasters such that causes of youth unemployment most likely extend beyond those cited by the mainstream economic literature. Nevertheless, we will discuss some the general causes and consequences of youth unemployment first, followed by a discussion of issues pertaining to Africa specifically.

A fall in aggregate demand will impact both youth and adult employment, but youth are usually disproportionately affected. Among the reasons for this outcome are the following: that firstly, employers find it easier to lay-off younger workers in times of economic downturn because fewer resources would have been invested in them and secondly, that less legislative protection is generally available to youth (Rees 1986). In general, it should also be borne in mind that in the face of insufficient aggregate demand, the most well designed and well implemented youth policies are likely to be fruitless.

Lack of skills among youth is a more pronounced problem in developing and transition economies. In most countries that have initiated free education programmes these are limited to primary education, which provides basic skills that need to be enhanced if they are to be applied in any substantive manner (UN Habitat 2004). In other countries not offering such schemes the student dropout rates are high and this worsens the situation. Employment opportunities are therefore very low while resources devoted to skill development and training are often few to none. The public sector (ministries of labour) can be instrumental in emphasizing youth employment creation as a major policy. However, in many African countries ministries of labour have suffered substantial cuts in their staff and budgets, due in part to structural adjustment policies. As a result, many countries are unable to successfully integrate labour market policies within the macroeconomic framework.

Furthermore, self-employment is a viable option in addressing youth joblessness. Indeed, evidence from South African surveys indicates that most young people are motivated to start their own businesses because of the limited opportunities in the labour market. However, sustainability is a major constraining factor. It is governed by availability of investment capital, risk absorption capacity, financial management skills, enterprise development, and market accessibility (UN Habitat 2004).

In economies with relatively low levels of joblessness concern is mainly directed adult unemployment as youth unemployment is very often of short duration. In many African countries, however, urban unemployment is relatively high and as a result youth unemployment duration is protracted. Duration of unemployment leads to an increase in the negative consequences of unemployment. These include material hardship as well as physiological and psychological well-being. Youth in these circumstances are at risk of social exclusion. Furthermore, prolonged periods of unemployment occurring early in an individual's life can significantly impede productive potential because flexibility and ability to be trained generally decline with age. At best this would result in intermittent spells of unemployment and low-wage employment throughout their working lives.

Turning to Africa-specific aspects of youth unemployment, it was established in earlier sections of the paper that urban youth are most adversely affected by unemployment while rural youth get absorbed into agricultural employment. Yet large numbers of youth flock to urban areas every year. These urban areas often experience water and housing shortages as well as schooling and health facilities near collapse. The industrial base is often limited while the municipal tax base and other services tend to be limited (Sommers 2003). Sommers goes on to argue that many youth opt to brave the harsh urban environment in a bid to flee conflict ridden rural areas. One consequence of this trend is that youth put increasing pressure on urban educational and economic resources necessary to effectively integrate them into society (Harsch 2001). The fear is that failure to integrate youth into society is likely to perpetuate the cycle of political instability, ethnic wars, revolutions, and anti-government activities that are observable in many countries. Indeed, youth alienation can be manipulated as was the case in Sierra Leone with the child and youth soldiers of the Revolutionary United Front (Junger 2002).

There is hardly any migration of urban youth to rural areas indicating that youth in urban areas are likely to remain there (Ogbu and Ikiara 1995). Sommers (2003) argues that there needs to be a shift in perceptions of who the youth are. They should not just be viewed as troublemakers, instead there should be a concerted effort to reach out to them in order to tap into them as a resource.

It seems fitting to end this sub-section with the following points that arose from a youth workshop in Kenya, as challenges facing youth. These are likely to be applicable to many of the other African countries in this study.

- Youth are not well prepared for adulthood as they are not provided with mentors to give them advice.
- Access to secondary schools is limited and alternative forms of education are lacking. Furthermore, the suitability of education/vocational to the labour market is limited.

- Youth of certain geographical regions are marginalised with restricted access to opportunities available to other young people.
- Many youth have been displaced (especially in slums) with the demolition and forced relocation of their homes.
- The absence of youth in actual decision-making or implementation of policies affecting them.
- Corruption which results in unequal access to resources especially when youth are trying to establish businesses.
- Transition from an agrarian to an information based society while knowledge is not keeping up with the changes. In addition, changes in social expectations create additional pressures as children are obliged to take on the role of adults in households decimated by HIV/Aids.

## **6. Policy implications and recommendations**

In this section we discuss possible interventions to help youth find gainful employment. Preceding discussion in this paper has highlighted the following stylized representations about the operation of youth labour markets in Africa:

- Migration of youth from rural to urban areas is a key labour market issue. Besides economic reasons, youth also migrate to avoid ethnic factions in rural areas and because of the desire to be urbanized. The policy implications of these reasons to migrate are that measures taken to develop rural areas may fail in encouraging urban youth to relocate to rural areas.
- Youth outcomes in the labour market, proxied by participation and employment patterns, are worse than those of adults. Lower urban youth participation rates suggest that youth perceptions of their chances of employment are lower than those of adults. The rural labour market on the other hand favours both youth and adults.
- Agriculture is important to the high rural employment rates of youth and adults in many countries.
- Gender biases exist within the family such that youth gender differences are largely in the activities they undertake rather than in participation and unemployment. That is, higher proportions of male youth are students while higher proportion of female youth are homemakers, while there are similar gender proportions participating and unemployed.
- Education levels are generally low with few countries having greater than 10% of youth with secondary or tertiary level educational attainment. This fact, coupled with the finding that returns to education are high at the late secondary and tertiary levels, makes a case for a sustained drive to increase average years of educational attainment beyond levels associated with basic literacy.
- Generally, returns to education are not less for women once they have entered the labour market. However, their entry is lower such that realized returns are lower.
- The activities of household heads are broadly correlated with activities of all employed members of the household such that the degree of well being of a household will influence the effectiveness of youth policies directed at its members.
- The unemployment rate is not a suitable indicator of youth labour market outcomes. A number of alternative measures have been suggested and the

most appealing one, in our view, is the youth 'inactivity rate' which concentrates on the proportion of a specific age cohort (15-19 or 20-24) who are neither in full-time education nor in full-time work.

- It is difficult to recommend a single definition of youth as definitions vary widely across countries. However, it seems that focus should be on the lower bound age because evidence presented indicates that youth stop schooling at low levels and thus enter the labour market early. In addition, changing family structures as a result of the HIV/Aids pandemic force youth to assume parental responsibilities too soon and this would also lead to early school leaving.

Adequate cross-country definitions of youth and of employment and unemployment have proved elusive. Labour markets and education systems seem to operate in different ways in different contexts. Resultant differences in educational participation patterns, levels of schooling, the extent of joint participation in school and work, seasonal employment, and underemployment all have an important bearing on an appropriate policy matrix for any country. That said, it is still possible to air some labour market policy options for youth and to reflect on these in the light of the evidence in this paper. Indeed, this is how we proceed with this policy discussion.

We discuss possible interventions to help youth find gainful employment. Active labour market policies (ALMP) are a popular form of intervention and they involve two kinds of policy:

- Promoting self-employment, usually through a combination of training in business methods, facilitated access to credit and access to work space.
- Promoting wage employment usually through a combination of subsidized work placement and vocational training

Of concern though in many countries is that ALMP usually help those already in a position to help themselves rather than those who are most in need (O'Higgins 2001). Furthermore, it is difficult to assess the usefulness of different policies because most programmes are not subject to rigorous evaluation.

### **6.1. Policies to promote self-employment and entrepreneurship**

The ILO estimates that 93% of new jobs in Africa and virtually all new jobs for youth on the continent are generated in the informal sector. Furthermore, results from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) research project indicate that the highest prevalence rate of entrepreneurial activity is to be found among 25-34 year old men (20 per 100), followed by 35-44 year old men (15 per 100) and then 18 to 24 year old men (13 per 100). Thus even though the highest prevalence of entrepreneurship is not among the youth, they are nevertheless engaging in entrepreneurship. However, promoting youth entrepreneurship should not be the only policy goal, neither should it necessarily be the main approach. It should also be borne in mind that entrepreneurship is also determined by opportunity and willingness to become an entrepreneur. Opportunity is affected by one's intrinsic entrepreneurial ability (which can be cultivated), starting capital, ease of entry into the labour market, and the general macroeconomic environment. Nevertheless, promoting entrepreneurship is made difficult by the risk averse nature of many institutions such as banks and education providers. The following is a list of interventions that are necessary for the promotion of self employment.

Introducing the self-employment option:

- The use of role models is an effective method of stimulating entrepreneurial spirit among youth. Experienced business people can be used to promote self-employment as a viable income generating occupation rather than simply as a means of escaping unemployment.
- Curricula should be geared towards enterprise so as to widen the career aspirations of young people. South Africa has recently undergone extensive redesign of its school curriculum and has introduced outcomes based education in what is called Curriculum 2005. An integral part of this new education policy is the fostering of entrepreneurial spirit among young learners.
- Links need to be created between educational institutions and industry so that learners can explore the opportunities for self employment through practical and direct involvement in local business.

## **6.2. Policies that promote wage employment**

### **Work experience versus training**

A combination of subsidized work experience and vocational training has been found to produce the best results (O'Higgins 2001). Work experience schemes alone tend to produce a 'dead weight effect' where youth that are employed as a result of a scheme replace others that would have been employed in any case. Substitution could also occur where programme participants replace other categories of labour, for example older workers. Vocational training schemes alone are less effective because they do not facilitate access to employers and job specific training which would increase their value to employers (Grubb 1995).

### **Targeting**

Closely targeted programmes have been found to be more effective than non-targeted ones (OECD 1993); the reason being that they are better designed to meet the needs of specific groups. In the context of developing countries an issue for consideration is whether focus should be on youth who are most at risk of not making a successful transition to decent work or on what will achieve the most cost effective outcome (Curtain 2004). Targeting better educated youth could significantly enhance a programme's chances of success and this may be enough justification to shift targeting away from the poorest of the youth.

### **Scale of programmes**

The effectiveness of programmes has been found to decrease with scale (O'Higgins 2001). These diminishing marginal returns set in because it is more difficult to tailor larger programmes to the specific needs of participants. In addition, the larger the scope of programmes, the smaller the scope for improving relative competitiveness of participants.

### **Decentralisation**

Implementation of programmes should be at the local level so that programmes are more relevant to local needs. The danger with decentralization though is that standards may vary between different regions of a country. To counteract this possibility, monitoring of programmes should occur at the national level.



### 6.3 Policies to improve schooling

We discuss a range of potential strategies to increase access, equity and quality of schooling based on successes that have been achieved in some countries. It should be pointed out that many of these policies would require additional resource outlays therefore policies to reduce costs and improve cost-effectiveness would also be called for.

#### Policies to increase access and achieve gender equity

- **Reduce direct and indirect costs** of primary schooling as these have been found to be a significant constraint to primary school enrolment. This can be achieved by abolishing fees at the primary level, making the wearing of school uniforms optional (as in Ethiopia, Malawi, Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania), subsidizing school attendance (as in the World Bank-funded scholarship for girls in secondary education), and introducing flexible timetabling (especially during harvest time in rural areas). The effects of these policies are mixed though. In Tanzania, for example, pupils reported dropping out of school because they did not have uniforms even though uniforms were optional. The scholarship programme in Tanzania seemed to increase female-secondary-school participation but did not improve school achievement. In Mali flexible timetabling has been introduced with great success in community schools as girl's enrolment has increased in these schools.
- **Reduce cultural impediments to girls attending school** as we have shown that biases within the family and society in general impact on female schooling. One policy towards this end is to strengthen school-community relationships (as in Tanzania, Malawi, Mali and Uganda) because parental involvement in school governance is often minimal. Increasing the proportion of female teachers is another desirable policy because of the evidence that female primary enrolments are responsive to this. Female role models have been found to be important in motivating parents to send their daughters to school. Another policy is to reduce the official school starting age as it has been found that primary school completion is more likely if children start school at a younger age. This is especially true for girls who are likely drop out once puberty is reached and home responsibilities and pressures to marry thus increase. Adult non-formal education should also be increased as this has a significant effect on the likelihood of children attending school. A pregnancy policy that allows readmission after delivery should be encouraged in order to foster greater educational gender equality.

#### Policies to enhance school quality

- **Infrastructure** should be provided where necessary because in many instances there is an absence of schools near home, an absence of adequate classrooms with desks and chairs, latrines and water.
- **Textbooks and learning materials** are often in short supply more so in rural areas and provision for these resources should be made.
- **Class-size and number of teachers per class** need to be addressed. . Malawi in 1997 had an average pupil/class ratio of 68/1 for primary school while Uganda had more than one class per teacher on average.

- **Eliminating gender stereotypes** in school environments is important as they impact on the performance of female learners especially in the post primary grades.
- **Teacher training, working conditions, supervision of and support to teachers** are issues that impact on teacher attitude and dedication and thus deserve special attention.
- **The language of instruction** is a hot topic for debate especially in the Francophone states where children are taught in French, a language they do not understand, when beginning primary school. Often it is parents, however, who are resistant to use of a local language as they see it as limiting the future prospects of their children.

#### **6.4. Further interventions that should be carried out are the following:**

- Skill training such that youth can identify and respond to opportunities.
- Mentor support in the form of an experienced business person to offer informal advice and guidance
- Facilitating finance which youth usually find tough to obtain. The Umsobomvu Youth Fund in South Africa, for example, offers micro loans for young entrepreneurs and has created a venture capital fund underwritten by a mainstream bank, with UYF providing guarantees.
- Support needs to be provided to young entrepreneurs that seek to expand their businesses.
- Support networks should be facilitated as they are often key to setting up an own business
- Develop holistic programmes that include life skills and basic literacy training to augment youth employment programmes
- Target marginalized youth who are often unpopular within urban society, who may be ill or in economic need
- Learn from religious outreach programmes such as those of the Pentecostal churches, which provide youth with a range of networks

#### **6.5. Experiences from South Africa and Kenya Learnerships**

Learnerships in South Africa are structured programmes integrating theoretical learning with workplace experience. The aim of this policy is that youth receive theoretical training in an identified area through an accredited training service provider. In addition, they are placed in a structured workplace in order to gain experience. Learnerships involve a partnership between government, training service providers and the private sector.

#### **National youth service**

The National Youth Service (NYS) is another South African initiative that aims to increase the quality and scope of government service delivery by harnessing the potential of young people. By so doing the employability of youth is enhanced. The NYS model reflects an integrated approach to community service, skills development and access to employment opportunities. Youth are trained in a technical skill (e.g. HIV/Aids) and then have an opportunity to apply and reinforce the learning by providing community service. Youth thus receive personal development skills training and focus on developing a career path.

### **Stable points of reference for youth**

The urban environment is characterised by fragmentation, isolation, violence and struggle for survival. In South Africa youth advisory centres (YAC) have been set up where youth can access a combination of employment related skills and resources. The YACs are largely funded by the Umsobomvu Youth Fund (mentioned under 6.4) and implemented by NGOs. The YACs are located in communities with large youth populations. These centres promote contact, information, and counselling services to young people. Each YAC has computers, online connectivity and vital information relating to careers and job opportunities. Furthermore, training workshops are provided on life skills and job related skills.

### **Public works programmes**

Pertaining to youth, the department of Public Works in South Africa has initiated the expanded public works programme (EPWP). It is viewed as a key short-term mechanism to increase employability, provide work experience and create value chains through entrepreneurship. Results on the success of this initiative have not yet been obtained. However, lessons can be learned from other public works initiatives that were implemented in the mid 1990s.

In the mid 1990s South Africa adopted two kinds of schemes where government creates jobs in a bid to reduce unemployment. The first is the Community Employment Programme (CEP) and the second is the National Public Works Programme (NPWP) and involves the adoption of more labour intensive methods in the construction of public infrastructure. The CEP is a series of community based schemes where wages are negotiated at community level, often at half or less than the formal wage rate. Most NPWP, on the other hand, are administered by provincial governments that permit wages to vary within individual provinces. Both programmes have tended to focus on rural areas, using task based payment systems. The focus on rural areas is appropriate for South Africa because of the absence of the rural agriculture safety net that is present in so many of the African countries studied in this paper. Furthermore, experience has been that these programmes work well in rural areas but that there is difficulty in applying the same principles in urban areas. The main problem in urban areas is that inimical forces intervene in the wage setting process and demand formal sector wage rates for project workers. Trade unions have also proved to be an obstacle with respect to longer range plans to encourage labour-intensive construction in the provision of public infrastructure. Trade unions oppose task-based payment on these long term projects and want government to be the employer, providing its normal benefits package and conditions of employment.

### **On promoting successful partnerships**

A number of factors have been found to promote successful partnerships and alliances among organizations promoting the well-being of youth:

- Involving a wide range of community stakeholders
- Tapping into existing municipal resources
- Involving youth in the design and implementation of projects
- Ensuring adequate training and skills development
- Meeting quality standards

However, from the policy point of view there is one key restriction in all of the analysis presented up to this point. This is the paucity of evidence in the literature and in the data about the *determinants* of the behaviour of youth. The paper does not have much to say about the factors affecting a youth's decision to migrate or the decision to stay in school another year versus leaving school in order to look for work. Behavioural issues such as these are often at the very heart of the debate about appropriate labour market policies. For example, if the functioning of rural and urban labour markets is such that the most productive rural youth tend to migrate to urban areas, this changes the calculation of expected returns to education at the rural end.

This paper has clearly established the fact that youth labour market dynamics are a major component of aggregate labour market outcomes. Given this, the acknowledgement of gaps in our knowledge concerning key behavioural parameters affecting optimal policy design amounts to a strong plea for directing research and research resources towards an understanding of these issues.

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## Appendix

**Table 1: Population shares by age**

	0-15	15-24	25-54	55-64	65+	15-64
Cote d'Ivoire	0.43	0.22	0.29	0.03	0.03	0.54
Burundi	0.49	0.19	0.27	0.03	0.03	0.48
Burkina Faso	0.47	0.19	0.27	0.04	0.04	0.50
Ethiopia	0.47	0.19	0.27	0.04	0.03	0.50
Ghana	0.43	0.18	0.30	0.04	0.05	0.52
Guinea	0.46	0.15	0.29	0.05	0.04	0.49
Kenya	0.45	0.20	0.29	0.04	0.03	0.52
Madagascar	0.44	0.19	0.31	0.03	0.03	0.54
Mozambique	0.46	0.19	0.29	0.04	0.03	0.51
Malawi	0.44	0.21	0.28	0.03	0.03	0.53
Nigeria	0.39	0.17	0.36	0.04	0.03	0.57
Sao Tome and Principe	0.56	0.27	0.25	0.04	0.04	0.42
Uganda	0.51	0.18	0.24	0.03	0.03	0.45
Zambia	0.41	0.23	0.27	0.03	0.06	0.54
Cameroon	0.43	0.20	0.29	0.04	0.04	0.53

**Table 2: Labour force participation rates by location and age**

	Rural		Urban		Total		
	15-24	25-54	15-24	25-54	15-24	25-54	Youth/Adult Age Ratio
Cote d'Ivoire	0.74	0.92	0.43	0.8	0.58	0.86	0.67
Burundi	0.74	0.99	0.26	0.8	0.71	0.97	0.73
Burkina Faso	0.92	0.96	0.52	0.82	0.83	0.93	0.89
Ethiopia	0.2	0.58	0.4	0.76	0.24	0.61	0.39
Ghana	0.77	0.84	0.92	0.96	0.83	0.88	0.94
Guinea	0.94	0.97	0.56	0.86	0.77	0.94	0.82
Kenya	0.25	0.59	0.56	0.85	0.31	0.65	0.48
Madagascar	0.84	0.97	0.58	0.9	0.78	0.95	0.82
Mozambique	0.31	0.61	0.56	0.9	0.37	0.67	0.55
Malawi	0.22	0.58	0.17	0.71	0.22	0.6	0.37
Nigeria	0.28	0.7	0.29	0.86	0.29	0.76	0.38
Sao Tome and Principe	0.52	0.77	0.39	0.7	0.44	0.73	0.60
Uganda	0.17	0.63	0.28	0.79	0.19	0.66	0.29
Zambia	0.59	0.89	0.36	0.74	0.49	0.84	0.58
Cameroon	0.59	0.91	0.38	0.8	0.5	0.86	0.58

**Table 3: Unemployment rates by location and age**

	Rural		Urban	
	15-24	25-54	15-24	25-54
Cote d'Ivoire	0.05	0.01	0.33	0.14
Burundi	0.00	0.01	0.44	0.13
Burkina Faso	0.01	0.01	0.28	0.08
Ethiopia	0.10	0.06	0.34	0.14
Ghana	0.76	0.08	0.82	0.17
Guinea	0.02	0.01	0.29	0.10
Kenya	0.33	0.08	0.35	0.09
Madagascar	0.05	0.04	0.24	0.12
Mozambique	0.27	0.08	0.63	0.26
Malawi	0.05	0.02	0.15	0.03
Nigeria	0.17	0.01	0.22	0.02
Sao Tome and Principe	0.30	0.04	0.22	0.04
Uganda	0.02	0.00	0.08	0.03
Zambia	0.10	0.04	0.54	0.15
Cameroon	0.05	0.01	0.33	0.14

**Table 4: Share of agricultural employment in total employment**

	Rural		Urban	
	15-24	25-54	15-24	25-54
Burkina Faso	0.98	0.96	0.49	0.29
Burundi	0.96	0.94	0.21	0.09
Cameroon	0.81	0.77	0.08	0.09
Cote d'Ivoire				
Ethiopia				
Ghana	0.55	0.61	0.14	0.15
Guinea	0.94	0.92	0.12	0.10
Kenya	0.62	0.59	0.14	0.05
Madagascar	0.87	0.81	0.52	0.32
Malawi	0.81	0.75	0.06	0.05
Mozambique				
Nigeria				
Sao Tome and Principe	0.40	0.42	0.13	0.15
Uganda	0.74	0.79	0.05	0.10
Zambia	0.91	0.85	0.14	0.09

Note: Empty cells indicate unavailability of data.

**Table 5: Occupation status of all employed individuals of all ages**

		Non-agriculture		Agriculture	
		Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
Burkina Faso	Volunteer	1.7	0.7	0.0	
	Employer	0.1	0.9	0.3	0.2
	Informal Empl	18.3	7.7	78.5	71.7
	Self Employed	56.0	39.7	21.2	27.4
	Wage, Formal sector	5.4	32.4	0.1	0.6
	Government Employee	18.5	18.6		0.0
Cameroon	Volunteer	3.6	4.8	0.1	1.0
	Employer	2.8	3.6	0.4	1.6
	Informal Empl	11.6	15.6	1.9	4.3
	Other	5.0	4.7	34.2	16.5
	Self Employed	51.6	38.4	61.9	69.2
	Wage, Formal sector	11.0	19.1	0.5	5.3
	Government Employee	14.4	13.8	1.1	2.1
Ghana	Employer	4.2	3.7	0.4	1.6
	Other	0.2	0.0	0.4	2.2
	Self Employed	69.3	63.4	97.1	91.7
	Wage, Formal sector	13.1	19.3	2.0	2.9
	Government Employee	13.1	13.6	0.1	1.7
Guinea	Volunteer	2.0	0.0	68.5	58.7
	Employer	1.5	1.5		
	Informal Empl	1.2	3.2		
	Other	0.7	0.8	0.4	0.5
	Self Employed	88.3	72.1	31.1	40.9
	Wage, Formal sector	1.1	9.8		
Kenya	Employer	0.5	1.5	0.4	1.3
	Informal Empl	27.0	31.5	16.1	23.3
	Self Employed	39.2	25.0	72.4	50.0
	Wage, Formal sector	12.4	24.1	7.7	15.9
	Government Employee	20.8	18.0	3.3	9.4
Sao Tome and Principe	Volunteer	0.4	0.5		
	Employer	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3
	Informal Empl	29.7	33.3	62.9	54.5
	Other	3.3	3.2		
	Wage, Formal sector	44.3	40.1	28.2	32.9
	Government Employee	22.1	22.8	8.7	12.3
Uganda	Employer	50.1	44.3	93.8	80.7
	Self Employed	0.1	0.6	0.0	0.2
	Wage, Formal sector	28.3	43.6	6.1	18.1
	Government Employee	21.5	11.4	0.1	1.1

**Table 6: Activity distribution of rural 15-24 youth, by gender**

Country	Employed		Homemaker		Student		Unemployed	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Cote d'Ivoire	0.74	0.73	0.00	0.09	0.21	0.08	0.03	0.05
Burundi	0.70	0.77	0.00	0.01	0.27	0.21	0.00	
Burkina Faso	0.92	0.89	0.00	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.02
Ethiopia	0.25	0.12	0.56	0.79	0.17	0.07	0.02	0.02
Ghana	0.18	0.20	0.21	0.25			0.61	0.55
Guinea	0.88	0.96		0.01	0.10	0.01	0.02	0.02
Kenya	0.20	0.15	0.20	0.37	0.51	0.40	0.09	0.08
Madagascar	0.80	0.80			0.15	0.10	0.03	0.06
Mozambique	0.29	0.16	0.37	0.65	0.22	0.07	0.08	0.09
Malawi	0.22	0.20	0.09	0.37	0.57	0.31	0.02	0.01
Nigeria	0.33	0.16	0.03	0.50	0.55	0.31	0.08	0.03
Sao Tome and Principe	0.53	0.20	0.06	0.44	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.14
Uganda	0.21	0.12	0.22	0.44	0.56	0.36	0.01	0.00
Zambia	0.50	0.57	0.09	0.20	0.34	0.17	0.06	0.05
Cameroon	0.53	0.58	0.00	0.11	0.35	0.17	0.04	0.02

**Table 7a: Activity distribution of urban 15-24 youth, by gender**

Country	Employed		Homemaker		Student		Unemployed	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Cote d'Ivoire	0.34	0.29	0.01	0.17	0.46	0.28	0.14	0.16
Burundi	0.18	0.12	0.00	0.15	0.63	0.56	0.12	0.11
Burkina Faso	0.46	0.30	0.00	0.23	0.39	0.29	0.13	0.16
Ethiopia	0.27	0.26	0.06	0.19	0.52	0.41	0.13	0.14
Ghana	0.13	0.19	0.07	0.09			0.80	0.72
Guinea	0.39	0.41		0.13	0.48	0.22	0.12	0.21
Kenya	0.42	0.31	0.06	0.24	0.34	0.22	0.18	0.21
Madagascar	0.49	0.40			0.35	0.34	0.10	0.17
Mozambique	0.26	0.16	0.08	0.12	0.35	0.26	0.27	0.44
Malawi	0.19	0.11	0.04	0.32	0.65	0.51	0.04	0.02
Nigeria	0.20	0.25	0.01	0.16	0.68	0.52	0.08	0.05
Sao Tome and Principe	0.44	0.17	0.04	0.43	0.34	0.31	0.11	0.06
Uganda	0.30	0.22	0.04	0.05	0.61	0.36	0.03	0.02
Zambia	0.20	0.13	0.12	0.39	0.43	0.31	0.24	0.16
Cameroon	0.33	0.19		0.10	0.44	0.41	0.14	0.11

Country	Employed		Unemployed	
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
Cote d'Ivoire	1.01	1.17	0.63	0.85
Burundi	0.92	1.48		1.12
Burkina Faso	1.04	1.54	0.65	0.80
Ethiopia	2.16	1.07	0.78	0.94
Ghana	0.88	0.66	1.12	1.12
Guinea	0.92	0.96	0.99	0.57
Kenya	1.32	1.35	1.07	0.83
Madagascar	1.00	1.23	0.53	0.57
Mozambique	1.85	1.58	0.91	0.61
Malawi	1.11	1.70	2.89	1.99
Nigeria	2.13	0.80	2.92	1.77
Sao Tome and Principe	2.66	2.56	1.19	1.70
Uganda	1.72	1.37	4.29	1.36
Zambia	0.88	1.49	1.21	1.51
Cameroon	0.91	1.69	1.78	1.24

**Table 8: Labour force participation of youth 15-24**

	Rural		Urban		Total			
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Rural	Urban
Cote d'Ivoire	0.74	0.74	0.46	0.41	0.59	0.56	0.74	0.43
Burundi	0.71	0.77	0.30	0.23	0.68	0.74	0.74	0.26
Burkina Faso	0.93	0.91	0.58	0.46	0.85	0.81	0.92	0.52
Ethiopia	0.27	0.14	0.40	0.39	0.29	0.19	0.20	0.40
Ghana	0.79	0.75	0.93	0.91	0.85	0.82	0.77	0.92
Guinea	0.89	0.98	0.51	0.61	0.72	0.83	0.94	0.56
Kenya	0.28	0.23	0.60	0.53	0.34	0.29	0.25	0.56
Madagascar	0.83	0.86	0.59	0.57	0.77	0.78	0.84	0.58
Mozambique	0.37	0.25	0.52	0.60	0.41	0.33	0.31	0.56
Malawi	0.24	0.21	0.22	0.13	0.24	0.20	0.22	0.17
Nigeria	0.41	0.18	0.28	0.30	0.35	0.23	0.28	0.29
Sao Tome and Principe	0.70	0.34	0.54	0.23	0.60	0.28	0.52	0.39
Uganda	0.21	0.12	0.33	0.24	0.23	0.14	0.17	0.28
Zambia	0.56	0.62	0.43	0.29	0.51	0.48	0.59	0.36
Cameroon	0.57	0.60	0.46	0.30	0.52	0.48	0.59	0.38

Country	Rural		Urban		Total	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Cote d'Ivoire	0.04	0.07	0.29	0.36	0.14	0.18
Burundi	0.00	0.00	0.40	0.47	0.01	0.01
Burkina Faso	0.01	0.02	0.22	0.35	0.04	0.06
Ethiopia	0.07	0.16	0.32	0.35	0.12	0.24
Ghana	0.78	0.73	0.86	0.79	0.81	0.76
Guinea	0.03	0.02	0.23	0.34	0.09	0.12
Kenya	0.31	0.35	0.29	0.40	0.30	0.37
Madagascar	0.04	0.07	0.17	0.30	0.06	0.11
Mozambique	0.21	0.35	0.51	0.73	0.30	0.51
Malawi	0.07	0.03	0.16	0.14	0.08	0.04
Nigeria	0.19	0.14	0.29	0.15	0.23	0.15
Sao Tome and Principe	0.24	0.41	0.20	0.27	0.22	0.34
Uganda	0.03	0.01	0.08	0.08	0.04	0.03
Zambia	0.11	0.08	0.54	0.54	0.26	0.19
Cameroon	0.07	0.04	0.30	0.37	0.16	0.13

<b>Table 10: Sector shares of employed individuals aged 15-24</b>					
		Male		Female	
		Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
Burkina Faso	Agriculture	0.986	0.429	0.968	0.591
	Banking/Finance		0.014		0.015
	Commerce	0.005	0.264	0.019	0.281
	Construction	0.001	0.060		0.003
	Manufacturing	0.002	0.137	0.010	0.080
	Mining	0.003	0.001	0.002	0.001
	Professional	0.004	0.054	0.001	0.026
	Public administration	0.000	0.008		0.002
	Transport	0.000	0.025		
	Utilities		0.006		
Cameroon	Agriculture	0.769	0.064	0.841	0.115
	Banking/Finance		0.002		0.003
	Commerce	0.070	0.264	0.094	0.347
	Construction	0.016	0.053	0.000	0.004
	Manufacturing	0.066	0.275	0.026	0.216
	Mining	0.003	0.005		
	Other	0.041	0.201	0.035	0.288
	Public administration	0.006	0.020	0.003	0.024
	Transport	0.024	0.104	0.000	0.001
	Utilities	0.004	0.012		0.002
Ghana	Agriculture	0.716	0.295	0.386	0.052
	Banking/Finance		0.060		
	Commerce	0.051	0.157	0.290	0.500
	Construction	0.022	0.061	0.016	
	Manufacturing	0.131	0.128	0.198	0.284
	Mining		0.009		
	Other	0.037	0.125	0.091	0.147
	Professional	0.005	0.034	0.013	0.005
	Public administration		0.014	0.003	
	Transport	0.026	0.108	0.003	0.007
	Utilities	0.013	0.009		0.004



**Table 11: Educational attainment by gender and age**

		Male		Female	
		15-24	25-54	15-24	25-54
Ethiopia	No Education	0.76	0.80	0.83	0.93
	Primary	0.20	0.13	0.14	0.04
	Secondary	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.02
	Tertiary	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01
Kenya	No Education	0.47	0.40	0.50	0.63
	Primary	0.40	0.33	0.39	0.24
	Secondary	0.10	0.22	0.10	0.11
	Tertiary	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.01
Malawi	No Education	0.79	0.80	0.85	0.92
	Primary	0.18	0.09	0.12	0.04
	Secondary	0.03	0.09	0.02	0.03
	Tertiary	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01
Nigeria	No Education	0.22	0.50	0.41	0.66
	Primary	0.57	0.29	0.44	0.23
	Secondary	0.17	0.12	0.13	0.08
	Tertiary	0.04	0.09	0.02	0.03
Ghana	No Education	0.45	0.35	0.52	0.64
	Primary	0.52	0.44	0.45	0.28
	Secondary	0.02	0.10	0.02	0.03
	Tertiary	0.01	0.12	0.01	0.05
Guinea	No Education	0.74	0.78	0.91	0.94
	Primary	0.25	0.12	0.08	0.04
	Secondary		0.04		0.01
	Tertiary	0.01	0.06	0.00	0.01
Uganda	No Education	0.57	0.55	0.62	0.76
	Primary	0.39	0.31	0.34	0.19
	Secondary	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00
	Tertiary	0.02	0.11	0.02	0.05

**Table 12: Ever attended school by location and gender of 15-24 youth**

Country	Rural		Urban	
	male	Female	male	female
Cote d'Ivoire	0.57	0.38	0.81	0.60
Burundi	0.70	0.59	0.94	0.90
Burkina Faso	0.21	0.10	0.77	0.63
Ghana	0.88	0.77	0.96	0.90
Guinea				
Kenya	0.97	0.94	0.99	0.94
Madagascar	0.75	0.71	0.88	0.87
Malawi	0.92	0.82	0.99	0.98
Sao Tome and Principe	0.96	0.94	0.98	0.97
Uganda	0.91	0.82	0.98	0.95
Zambia	0.90	0.86	0.97	0.96
Cameroon	0.87	0.72	0.97	0.95
Ethiopia	0.46	0.20	0.91	0.80
Mozambique	0.71	0.48	0.92	0.84
Nigeria	0.76	0.49	0.94	0.86

**Table 13: Literacy rates by location, gender and age**

Country	Rural				Urban			
	Male		Female		Male		Female	
	15-24	25-54	15-24	25-54	15-24	25-54	15-24	25-54
Cote d'Ivoire	0.59	0.48	0.36	0.16	0.86	0.76	0.61	0.47
Burundi	0.71	0.53	0.70	0.26	0.92	0.91	0.89	0.77
Burkina Faso	0.20	0.16	0.10	0.05	0.72	0.55	0.57	0.36
Ghana	0.65	0.62	0.47	0.28	0.85	0.82	0.72	0.58
Guinea	0.20	0.10	0.05	0.01	0.67	0.17	0.41	0.10
Kenya	0.94	0.85	0.92	0.65	0.98	0.96	0.93	0.89
Madagascar	0.24	0.27	0.21	0.20	0.58	0.62	0.58	0.53
Malawi	0.66	0.59	0.54	0.31	0.90	0.89	0.87	0.80
Sao Tome and Principe	0.93	0.95	0.91	0.75	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.80
Uganda	0.83	0.78	0.70	0.47	0.96	0.93	0.89	0.82
Zambia								
Cameroon	0.82	0.69	0.66	0.46	0.96	0.93	0.93	0.84
Ethiopia	0.43	0.35	0.17	0.06	0.90	0.81	0.80	0.50
Mozambique	0.56	0.54	0.29	0.13	0.88	0.87	0.76	0.54
Nigeria	0.77	0.38	0.51	0.28	0.95	0.82	0.86	0.60

**Table 14: Activity of household head**

Country	Employer	Informal Sector	Other	Self-Employee	Volunteer	Wage EMPL, Formal	Wage EMPL, Government
Burkina Faso	0.013	0.005		0.861	0.002	0.056	0.063
Burundi	0.001	0.012	0.004	0.907		0.033	0.042
Cameroon	0.022	0.081	0.008	0.686	0.003	0.096	0.105
Ethiopia	0.035	0.109	0.002	0.023		0.789	0.042
Ghana	0.023		0.003	0.757		0.121	0.095
Guinea	0.008	0.010	0.105	0.778	0.002	0.041	0.057
Kenya	0.010	0.188		0.506		0.152	0.145
Madagascar	0.029	0.038		0.746	0.004	0.112	0.071
Malawi	0.011	0.032	0.021	0.680		0.159	0.098
Mozambique	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.834		0.056	0.102
Nigeria	0.005	0.706		0.159	0.000	0.018	0.111
Sao Tome and Principe	0.002	0.458			0.003	0.341	0.196
Uganda	0.827			0.002		0.119	0.052
Zambia	0.003	0.013	0.006	0.710		0.123	0.144

**Table 15: Sector of employment of household head**

	Agriculture	Banking/Finance	Commerce	Construction	Manufacturing	Mining
Burkina Faso	0.80	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.03	0.01
Burundi	0.88	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.00
Cameroon	0.56	0.00	0.14	0.02	0.07	0.00
Ghana	0.51	0.01	0.16	0.03	0.10	0.01
Guinea	0.60	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.02
Kenya	0.47		0.29	0.04	0.04	0.00
Madagascar	0.69	0.00	0.07		0.06	0.00
Malawi	0.67	0.04	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.01
Sao Tome and Principe	0.32	0.01	0.16	0.08	0.10	
Uganda	0.72	0.01	0.10	0.02	0.04	0.01
Zambia	0.58	0.02	0.14	0.02	0.05	0.03
	Other	Professional	Public administration	Transport	Utilities	
Burkina Faso		0.04	0.03	0.01	0.00	
Burundi		0.03	0.03	0.00		
Cameroon	0.08		0.08	0.04	0.01	
Ghana	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.00	
Guinea		0.04	0.10		0.13	
Kenya			0.12	0.04		
Madagascar	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.02	
Malawi	0.10	0.00		0.01	0.01	
Sao Tome and Principe	0.21		0.08	0.05	0.01	
Uganda	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.00	
Zambia	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.00	